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Abstract 
The goal of this study is to test the implication of Mankiv’s (1987) optimal seigniorage theory suggesting that in 
the long run higher tax rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates for 
Turkish Economy using time series dataset for the time period 1980-2011.We examine the long run relationship 
between nominal interest rates, inflation and tax revenue. For this purpose, we estimate the Mankiw’soptimal 
seigniorage model for Turkish Economy with the cointegration and vector error correction methods (VECM) 
techniques. According to econometric result, in long run there is a causality relationship from inflation and tax 
revenue to nominal interest rates. However, in short run we could not find any evidence that support the causality 
from inflation and tax revenue to nominal interest rates.  
Keywords: seigniorage and inflation tax, optimal seigniorage theory, Turkish economy, error correction model, 
cointegration analysis 
1. Introduction 
There are two sources for governments to raise their revenues: The first source is the direct taxation put on output, 
and the second source is seigniorage. Seigniorage is also known as printing new money and defined as the value of 
real resources acquired by the government through its power of sovereignty on its monopoly of printing money 
(Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 1994). But, both sources of revenue cause deadweight social losses (Mankiw, 
1987: 327-328), moreover inflation also brings some other social costs, such as reducing purchasing power of 
consumers, shoe leather costs, menu costs, variability in relative prices, imperfect indexation in the tax code and 
inconvenience. These costs are not very high for the moderate inflation commonly seen in industrial or 
developed countries (Foote, 2010: 58), but for developing countries, these costs can cause drastic social results.  
We know that a developing country has fewer options to finance its increasing public sector deficits compared 
with developed countries. These countries can finance their deficits with three different ways: Borrowing from 
banking sector, both state-owned and commercial bank, including the central bank, from non-bank national 
alternatives and from the international financial markets.As the financial system, consisted of banking sector, 
non-bank financial institutions and the financial markets are poor and shallow in developing countries, the 
financing deficit by the way one is relatively limited. After liberalization of the financial markets by the 1980s, 
borrowing from the international financial markets has become the most common way of financing deficits for 
developing countries (Samimi et al., 2012: 82-83). But when these countries lose their credibility as a result of 
debt crises, governments were forced to borrow from the central bank and commercial banking system. This 
requirement has forcedcentral banksto printmoney. For a developing country, domestic borrowing possibilities, 
to a great extent, may increase inflation. In this case it is a question whether the governmentscould collect 
maximum seigniorage revenue thanks to its monopoly on printing money (Korap, 2006: 5). 
On the other hand, inflation tax is also one of the drastic results of high inflation. Inflation tax is a term which 
refers to the reduction inthe real value of financial stocks in the hands ofthe peopledue to the effects of inflation. 
In other words, inflation tax has a welfare cost effect (Cooley and Hansen, 1989: 742). The real financial loss can 
be expressed as loss of purchasing power of money holder. Seignoirage revenue creates inflation and this 
inflation cause financial losses. There should be positive correlation between printing money, namely 
seigniorage revenue, and inflation tax. According to optimal seignoraige theory, nominal interest rates and 
inflation are determined due to government’snecessity to finance its budget deficit. If marginal cost of the tax is 
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increasing with income, then a positive relationship will occur between inflation and nominal interest rates and 
taxes (Aslan, 2003: 125). The theory indicates that that nominal interest rates and inflation are individually 
random walks, but suggests that the nominal interest rates and inflation move together with tax rates.Mankiw 
tested this theory for the United States of America (USA) for the period 1952-1985, and provided some support 
for the theory (Mankiw, 1987: 327).  
Many economists including Bailey (1956), Cagan (1956), Friedman (1971), Phelps (1973, 1972), Klein and 
Neumann (1990) and Marty (1967) analyze seigniorage revenue as a source of income to the government. In this 
point there are two different approaches trying to explain the relationship between seignoraige, nominal interest 
rates and inflation (Gürbüz et al, 2009: 55-56): The first approach belongs to monetarists. According to the 
monetarist theory an increase in the monetary base will increase monetary inflation. The rise in inflation reduces 
real money balances through a rising in the nominal interest rates. This affects the readjustment of cash between 
economic agents, and leads a rise in stocks and reduction of private consumption. According to the second 
approach developed by Phelps (1973), seigniorage revenue is equal to the multiplication of nominal interest rates 
and real money balances. Then, Phelps suggests that the income obtained by government depends on private 
sector’s nominal interest rate’s losses. 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between real seigniorage revenue and inflation tax for Turkish 
economy in a long time period 1980-2012. According to vector error correction (VECM) result of the study 
inflation and tax revenue has long run causality on interest rates. In long run inflation and tax revenue increases 
nominal interest rates positively and significantly. But in short run there is not causality between variables.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two gives a brief introduction on Turkish economy, inflation tax 
and seigniorage revenue, while section three introduces Mankiw’s (1987) optimal seignoriage model. Section 
four estimates the empiric model and inference of econometric findings. The final section concludes the study. 
2. Turkish Economy, Inflation Tax and Seigniorage Revenue 
Turkish economy lived a chronic high inflationary problem between 1978 and 2002. During this time period 
Turkish economy has experienced two digits and sometimes three digits inflationary years as in 1982 and 1994. 
In Table 1 inflation experience and narrow (M1) and broad money (M2) growth rate of Turkish economyis listed. 
While Table 2 shows inflation experience of some selected developing countries with narrow money M1 growth 
rate. From table 1, it is seen that Turkish experience was neither hyperinflation of the two digits price increases 
in a monthly time period nor a moderate inflation of the single digit in an annual time period; however Turkish 
experienceconstituted a privileged position in the world economy (Korap, 2006: 2). 2002 is the turning point in 
Turkish experience of inflation, because CBRT (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey) changed its monetary 
policy strategy from exchange rate anchor and money targeting regimes to the explicitly inflation targeting 
regime. Namely, a tradeoff between intermediate targeting regimes was happened in 2002. After that a drastic 
decline in inflationary process of Turkish economy has seen, and annual inflation rate has begun to cycle 
between 5% and 10%. It is also clear that there is a parallel movement between M2 growth rate and inflation 
rate, while M1 is not correlated with inflation at the same time period table 1.  
 
Table 1. Money stock and inflation in Turkey (% of GNP) 
Time Period ࣊ (%) M1/GNP (%) M2/GNP (%) 
1970-1979 24,27 17,04 21,16 
1980-1989 52,14 11,02 22,07 
1990-1999 79,10 6,19 18,90 
2000-2012 19,25 6,75 2,34 
Notes: ߨ is the annual percentage change of the consumer price index.  
Source: Writer’s calculation from CBRT dataset. 
 
Table 2 indicating, inflation and narrow money growth rate of some selected developing countries for the time 
period 1960-1990, gives a chance to make a comparision between developing countries and Turkey. It is seen 
that in selected developing countries, inflation fluctuate between 437 % and 2, 7 %. In these countries generally 
there is a positive correlation between M1 growth rate and inflation rate. Percentage change of narrow money 
base and inflation rate moves almost in the same scale in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.Table 2 also suggest that 
if money growth rate is two-digits, inflation is also two digits and vice versa.  
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Table 2. Inflation and money growth rate in selected developing countries 
 Yearly growth rate 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 
Argentina Inflation Rate 21,2 119,5 437,6 
M1 growth rate 23,2 108,6 400,4 
Brazil Inflation Rate 43,5 35,3 337,1 
M1 growth rate 48 43,5 339,8 
Chili Inflation Rate 28,9 130,3 20,3 
M1 growth rate 41 147 19,5 
Israel Inflation Rate 5,6 41,6 91,2 
M1 growth rate 3,7 48,9 99,6 
Mexico Inflation Rate 2,7 16,5 65,1 
M1 growth rate 12 24,4 58,4 
Uruguay Inflation Rate 44 62 60 
M1 growth rate 43 59 55,9 
Source: Carlos A. Vegh. (1992). Stopping High Inflation, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.39, No.3, p.633; Doğru, 2012. 
 
We also make a chronological analysis between inflation (INF), inflation tax (INFTX) and seigniorage (SEIG) 
revenue of Turkish economy between 1981 and 2011, presented in Figure 1. Definition of Inflation tax is 
obtained from Bailey (1956), i.e. multiplying annual change in consumer price index (CPI) with the previous 
year’s monetary base (∆ܥܲܫ ∗ ܯሺെ1ሻ/ܩܰܲሻ, while seigniorage revenue is calculated following Klein and 
Neumann (1990) and is equal to the change in monetary base (∆ܯ/ܩܰܲሻ. Both INFTX and SEIG is smoothed 
by gross national product (GNP), i.e. calculated as a share of GNP. The reference inflation used in this paper is 
the yearly change in CPI index. All the calculations based on the yearly data from 1981 to 2011, obtained from 
electronic data service of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. It is seen in figure 1 that Inflation tax and 
seigniorage revenue fluctuate in the range of 1.55 and 3.95 between 1981 and 1989. Along the whole 1990s and 
2000, except during and pre-1994 crisis, both inflation tax and the seigniorage revenue are sticky around 1-1.5 % 
GNP. Figure 1 also says that during high and volatile inflation periods, due to losses in real money balances, i.e. 
erosion of real demand for money, taxation base is reduced and thus high and fluctuating inflation does not 
necessarilyrequire for larger seigniorage revenue (Korap, 2006: 7; Rodrik, 1990: 12). 
 
 
Figure 1. Inflation, inflation tax and seigniorage revenue as share of G 
Source: CBRT. 
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3. Mankiw’s (1987) Optimal Seignoriage Model  
Inflationist financing method of budget deficit is denoted by special terms: Inflation tax and seigniorage revenue 
(Aslan, 2003: 127). Seigniorage is defined as real revenue rose from monopoly power of government on printing 
money and demonstrated with ∆ெ௉ ,	rate of change in monetary base to the inflation (Klein and Neumann, 1990: 
206). On the other hand inflation tax is a result of inflation and indicates the real capital losses of money holder, 
and defined as multiplication of inflation rate andreal value of the (outside) quantity of Money:	ߨሺெ௉ሻ(Phelps, 
1973; Bailey, 1956). Here we should also mention “growth seigniorage” which is the result of increasing demand 
for money in developing countries, having positive real growth rates (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1987: 647). 
Following Tobin (1956), Marty (1967) proposed to measure inflation tax with an alternative way by the rate of 
growth of money supply times real balances (Phelps, 1973: 68; Marty, 1967; 71). In this case real seigniorage 
revenue is equal to the multiplication of sum of inflation and growth rate and real money balances: (ߨ ൅
݃ሻ ቀெ௉ቁ െ where	g	is	real	growth	rate. In his “inflation policy book”, Phelps (1972) equals inflation tax to the 
multiplication of nominal interest rates and real balances, (ߨ ൅ ݎሻ ቀெ௉ቁ െwhere r is the real interest rate (Phelps, 
1972). This definition expresses that the income obtained by the government is then equivalent to the loss of the 
interest rate of the private sector (Gürbüz et al., 2009: 56). In this sense, seigniorage is a type of interest-free 
credit, paid by private sector due to holding liquid balance, transferred to the government (Aslan, 2003: 
127-128). 
The difference between seignorage and inflation tax is due to the changes in real money demand, arising from 
the result of changes inthe inflation rate, real income, and interest rates. This difference is usually known as a 
non-inflationary determinant of seignorage, depending on the increase inthe demand for money that isconsistent 
withzero inflation rates (Rodrik, 1990: 12). 
Given exogenous expenditure and an intertemporal budget constraint, when government expenditure is financed 
by monetary and fiscal policy, nominal interest rates and inflation move together with tax rates put on output 
over the time (Mankiw, 1987: 327). According to Mankiw, if fiscal policy dominates monetary policy then 
government should imply monetary and fiscal policies, targeting minimize social costs depending on tax and 
seigniorage revenue.  
Mankiw’sapproach can be summarizedas follows within the framework ofintertemporal analysis. The optimal 
intertemporal monetary and fiscal policy of a government should be examined under the following budget 
constraint in the present value (Mankiw, 1987: 328): 
׬ ݁ିఘ௦ܩሺݐ ൅ ݏሻ݀ݏ ൅ ܤሺݐሻ ൌஶ଴ ׬ ݁ିఘ௦ܶሺݐ ൅ ݏሻ݀ݏ
ஶ
଴                        (1) 
Where G(t) = real expenditure at time t, T( t ) = real revenue at time t, B(t) = real government debt at time r, ߩ = 
real discount rate (assumed constant over time). Expenditure is taken to be exogenous, and future expenditure is 
a random variable. The government takes into consideration two different financing way financing budget 
deficits to minimize social losses: Tax on output and seigniorage. If level of output and tax rate on output is 
denoted by ܻሺݐሻand ߬ሺݐሻ respectively, then revenue collected by government is ߬ሺݐሻܻሺݐሻ, and social losses 
caused bytaxes will be equal to f(߬)Y. Here, ݂ᇱ ൐ 0and݂ᇱᇱ ൐ 0. Suppose that M(t), P(t) and ݇in order show 
exogenous money supply, price level at time t and a constant respectively, then demand for money can be 
expressed within quantity equation as follows: 
ெሺ௧ሻ
௉ሺ௧ሻ ൌ 	ܻ݇ሺݐሻ		                                      (2)	
Suppose that the inflation rate and the growth rate of output are shown by π ൌ ୔ሶ୔ and	g ൌ
ଢ଼ሶ
ଢ଼ in order. Then the 
real seigniorage revenue equals to: 
ெሶ
௉ ൌ
ெሶ
ெ	 .
ெ
௉ ൌ ሺߨ ൅ ݃ሻܻ݇	                                  (3) 
Adding the sum of the receipts from direct taxation and seigniorage, we find a formulation for total government 
revenue as below: 
ܶ ൌ ܻ߬ ൅ ሺߨ ൅ ݃ሻܻ݇                                   (4) 
Assume that ݄ሺߨሻܻ indicates social cost of inflation, where h′>0 and hᇱᇱ ൐ 0.	Examples to the direct and 
indirect costs of inflation are menu cost and inefficient functioning of markets respectively. To overcome these 
costs, the government targets to minimize the expected present value of the social costs under the budget 
constraint:  
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ܧ௧ ׬ ݁ିఘ௦ሾ݂ሺ߬ሻ ൅ ݄ሺߨሻሿܻ݀ݏ	ஶ଴                              (5) 
For this purpose, the government has two choices: Inflation rate	ߨ1 and tax rateݏ. Mankiw then examines the 
first- order condition of the equation (5) for an optimum as below:  
ܧ௧ሼ	݂ᇱሾ߬ሺݐ ൅ ݏሻሿሽ ൌ ݂ᇱሾ߬ሺݐሻሿ                             (6) 
ܧ௧ሼ	݄ᇱሾߨሺݐ ൅ ݏሻሿሽ ൌ ݄ᇱሾߨሺݐሻሿ                             (7) 
݄ᇱሾߨሺݐሻሿ ൌ ݂݇′ሾ߬ሺݐሻሿ                                (8) 
Under budget constraint the optimal monetary and fiscal policy satisfies these three equations. 
The intertemporal first-order conditions (6) and (7) in order equates marginal social cost of taxation today and in 
the future, and the marginal social cost of inflation today and in the future. While, the static first-order condition 
(8) equates the marginal social costs of raising revenues through direct taxation and through seigniorage. 
According to first-order condition of equation (8), an increase in the government revenue requirement increases 
the use of both direct taxation and seigniorage. This usage leads a parallel movement between level of taxation, 
inflation and nominal interest rates (Mankiw, 1987: 329-331). Mankiwtest his optimal seigniorage theory for 
USA for a long time period covering 1952-1985. Findings are in the direction that there is a positive relationship 
between nominal interest rates and level of direct taxation. He has also obtained a log-run relationship between 
inflation rate and level of direct taxation. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this part, optimal seigniorage theory is tested for Turkish Economy with yearly data between 1980-2012. The 
fundamental property of the optimal seigniorage theory is that inflation rate and nominal interest rates are 
determined by revenue requirement of the government. If we could collect reliable estimates for marginal social 
cost of inflation, marginal social cost of direct taxation and interest elasticity of money demand, then equation 
(8) could be estimated to find out relationship between level of direct taxation, inflation and nominal interest 
rates at any point in time. Because we do not know these social costs, we prefer linear approximation to equation 
(8) for Turkish economy, as Mankiw did for USA, with time series data (Mankiw, 1987: 332). 
The goal of this study is to test the implication of optimal seigniorage theory that in the long run higher tax rates 
are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates. Namely, acointegration relationship 
between nominal interest rates, inflation and taxes is examined. We will decide whether there is a long-run 
equilibrium path for these variables. If they move together there should be an equilibriumpoint which nominal 
interest rates, inflation and taxes are converging to.  
Data used in this paper obtained from statistics of ministry of finance, data delivery system of the 
undersecretaries of treasury and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Definitions and some basic descriptive 
statistics of the variables we employed in the model are presented in table 3 with in level and in first differences. 
The choice of variables used in the model is based on previous studies in the related empirical literature. Table 3 
indicates that maximum volatility happens in INT and INF variables, corresponding in order to the inflation and 
compound interest rates during the time period considered. The mean of first differences given in table 3 are very 
near but not equal to zero. Hence, these findings could be accepted as the evidence of linear deterministic trend 
in levels of series (Güloğlu and Ivrendi, 2010).  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and definition of series in level 
Variables Def. Mean S. Dev Min. Val. Max. Val. Obs.
INF Percentage change of CPI 44.3 29.3 5.5 106.2 32 
TAX Ratio of total tax revenue to the GNP 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.24 32 
INT Compound interest ratesheld in nominal interest rates 50.8 59.9 6.24 342.2 32 
dINF First difference of INF -1.17 13.48 -19.97 39.87 31 
dTAX First difference of TAX 0.002 0.01 -0.02 0.04 31 
dINT First difference of INT -0.40 68.72 -265.86 258.17 31 
Source: CBRT. 
 
In the next section, we will firstly investigate stationarity and level of integration of time series we employ in the 
model. The determination of the degree of integration of series and the choice of appropriate cointegration 
analysis I(1) or I(2) is important to make appropriate econometric analysis (Güloğlu and İvrendi, 2010: 9). There 
are also some potential problems of using non-stationary data. Because non-stationary time series can cause 
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spurious (non-sense) regression results, as noted by Granger and Newbold (1974). Assume that we have a single 
equation as follow: 
Yt=1+ 2Xt+ut                                   (9) 
Where Yt~I(1) and Xt~I(1). If unit root tests on residuals indicates that utis stationary, then it is concluded 
thatsome linear combination of series Ytand Xtis stationary, althoughYtand Xtare individually non-stationary. In 
other words, linear combinations delete stochastic trend in series Xt and Yt. In this case, established regression 
line is significant and Xt and Yt is cointegrated. They move together in long run, and converge to an equilibrium 
path over the time (Engle and Granger, 1987: 251-276). 
4.1 Unit Root Tests  
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) unit root tests are employed 
to determine whether the variables are stationary. The unit root tests also turn out to be important in the 
determination of the degree of integration of series and the choice of appropriate cointegration analysis I(1) or 
I(2). ADF and KPSS unit root tests results for first differences of the series are presented in table 4 and table 5. 
The tables suggest that all of the series are I (1). Also this result can be seen from the graphs of series in first 
difference illustrated in figure 1 to figure 3. The graphical analysis of the differenced series indicatesthat the 
series are stationary with mean near zero. 
 
Table 4. ADF test results 
 (No intercept no trend) (Intercept) t(Intercept and Trend) 
INF -0.891 -0.897 -1.486 
TAX -0.879 -0.403 -1.664 
INT -2.594 -3.68* -3.69* 
dINF -5.953*** -5.855*** -6.164*** 
dTAX -5.489*** -5.768*** -5.616*** 
dINT -8.923*** -8.770*** -8.698*** 
Notes: Lag lengths are selected automatically according to Akaike Info Criterion. The critical values of test statistics (, , t ) are tabulated 
in Fuller (1976) and MacKinnon (1996). *: Test statistics are significant at 10 % level of significance. **: Test statistics are significant at 5% 
level of significance. ***: Test statistics are significant at 1% level of significance. 
  
Table 5. KPSS unit roots test results 
 (Intercept) t(Intercept and Trend) 
INF 0.208 0.207 
TAX 0.540 0.208 
INT 0.354 0.366 
dINF 0.244*** 0.106*** 
dTAX 0.102*** 0.148** 
dINT 0.172* 0.180* 
Notes: *: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected at 10 % level of significance. **: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not 
rejected at 5 % level of significance. ***: The null hypothesis of stationarity is not rejected at 1 % level of significance. Critical values are 
taken from Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) Table 1.  
 
As a result, we use I(1) of the variables to determine the number of cointegration vector by using Johansen 
analysis. 
4.2 Cointegration Analysis 
In this part we are examining whether the variables are cointegrated with each other. We know from Engle 
Granger (1987) that statitonary time series could make a linear combination converging to a long run equilibrium 
point over time. If one or more linear combination of individually non-stationary series is stationary then these 
series may be cointegrated. This means that these series cannot move too far away from each other (Dickey, 
Jansen and Thorton, 1991:58).We conclude from unit root tests that a VAR- based cointegration relationship 
developed by Johansen (1995) should be estimated in order to capturethe long termrelationships between 
variables. For this purpose, we estimate a k-lag Vector Error Correction Model by Johansen Method. But firstly, 
we determine lag length of unrestricted VAR model considering six different lag selection criterions including 
likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error Criterion (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 5, No. 6; 2013 
128 
 
information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinninformation criterion (HQ). VAR lag order selection criteria results 
are shown in table 6. The maximum lag number selected is 6.Besides endogenous variables we also add three 
dummy variables (D94, D01 and D08) in VAR model, to take into account the unpredicted shock effects of three 
economic crises: Two domestic and one global financial crisis occurred in 1994, 2001 and 2008 respectively. The 
dummy variables D94, D01 and D08 are unity for year 1994, 2001 and 2008 and zero otherwise. According to 
table 6, all the lag selection criterions suggest 2 lag orders.  
 
Table 6. VAR lag order selection criteria 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA 214.1282 13.87282 14.45348 14.04003 
1 100.2688 2.259201 9.287821 10.30398 9.580437 
2 26.26588* 1.777092* 1.963511* 5.41516* 2.381534 
3 9.361682 2.050114 8.935689 10.82283 9.479119 
4 9.474528 2.181165 8.680544 11.00318 9.349381 
5 7.084435 2.842831 8.360790 11.11892 9.155033 
6 21.30849 2.01561* 8.975976* 10.169605 9.895626* 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion. LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level). FPE: Final prediction 
error. AIC: Akaike information criterion. SC: Schwarz information criterion. HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
In order to determine the cointegration rank, we employ Johansen Test method. There are two test statistics for 
the number of cointegrating vectors: The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics. In the trace test, the null 
hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r, where r is 0, 1 or 2. In each case 
the alternative hypothesis is tested against general alternative. In the case of the maximum eigenvalue test, the 
null hypothesis r=0 is tested against the alternative that r=1, and null hypothesis r=1 is tested against the 
alternative r=2, etc. The critical values for these tests are obtained from Johansen and Juselius (1990). Table 7 
presents the results of Johansen Cointegration Test using the maximum eigenvalue and the trace tests. We cannot 
reject the hypothesis that r൑ 2, while the hypothesis r=0 and r=1 can be rejected for the trace test indicating that 
there is one cointegrating vector.For the maximum eigenvalue test, the hypothesis r=0 is rejected in favor of the 
r=1. Hence, both trace and max-eigen statistics suggest that there exists a unique cointegration relation (r=1) 
among three variables. Consequently, these two tests indicate that inflation is cointegrated with taxes and 
nominal interest rates. 
 
Table 7. Johansen cointegration test and cointegrating vectors for INT 
Test statistics 
Max- Eigenvalue statistics Trace statistics 
H0 λmax CV (95%) Probβ. H0 Trace CV(95%) Probβ. 
r=0* 31.117 25.823 0.009 r=0 62.216 42.915 0.0002 
r=1* 22.643 19.387 0.016 r1 31.098 25.872 0.0102 
r=2 8.4551 12.517 0.216 r2 8.4551 12.517 0.2167 
Normalized Cointegrating Vector 
TAX INT INF TREND 
3104.502 (528. 222) 1.000000 -3.098777(0.485) 10.5387 (2.507) 
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients 
INF INT TAX TREND(82) 
0.058259 -0.018829 64.34726 -0.198423 
0.098995 -0.043027 1.520516 0.153569 
-0.000792 0.023878 4.269811 0.035573 
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients. 
D(INF) -7.406304 -2.958467 -4.048178 
D(INT) -9.116669  11.17821 -27.54609 
D(TAX) -0.005784  0.006141  0.001574 
Notes: CV denotes critical values, Critical values are tabulated from Johansen and Juselius (1990). * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 
percent level. β shows MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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Table 7 reports one cointegrating vector linking inflation, tax and nominal interest rates. But a cointegrating 
vector barely represents a long run relationship between endogenous variables. Because they are interpreted that 
there is one linear combination for which the variance is bounded (Dickey, Jansen and Thorton, 1991: 76). 
Structural short and long-run relationships are indicated in VECM estimation. A VECM model with our variables 
is simply stated as follow:  
݀ሺܫܰ ௧ܶሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ݀ሺܫܰܨ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ݀ሺܶܣܺ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܧܥܶሺെ1ሻ ൅ ߝ௧	              (10) 
Where; INT, INF and TAX are at the first differenced variables. ߚ଴ is intercept, ߚଵ and ߚଶ are short run 
coefficient and ܧܥܶሺെ1ሻ is the one period lag residual of below model:  
ܫܰ ௧ܶ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵ ∗ ܫܰܨ௧ ൅ ߠଶ ∗ ܶܣܺ௧ ൅ ߴ௧	                       (11) 
ܧܥܶሺെ1ሻ shows the adaptation rate to the long run equilibrium, and is also known as equilibrium error term of 
one period lag. ECT (-1) is an error correction term and leads variables INT, INF and TAX of the system to 
converge or to back to the long run equilibrium point. It corrects disequilibrium. Therefore, the sign of ߚଷshould 
be negative. The significant and negative ߚଷcoefficient shows what rate it corrects the previous period 
disequilibrium of the system. Hence, it means that there exists a long run equilibrium relationship among 
variables INT, TAX and INF stated in model 11.  
VECM estimation result with two lagged is reported in Table 8. The coefficient of error correction term (ECT 
(-1)) of the model 1 has been -0.31 meaning that system corrects its previous period disequilibrium at a speed of 
approximately 31 percent yearly. In other saying, almost 31% of deviation from long run equilibrium is 
smoothed in one year.Moreover the sign of ECT(-1) coefficient, significant and negative, as it is expected, 
indicates that there existed a long run causality from INF and TAX to INT. Error correction term of the model 2 
and 3 is insignificant. This result indicates that in long run tax revenue and nominal interest rates cause inflation.  
According to estimation result of cointegration equation (long-run relationship) on the top of table 8 there is a 
strong and significant long run relationship between nominal interest rates and inflation. It implies that an 
increase in inflation is associated with a 2.51 percentage increase in the nominal interest rates. Direction of the 
relationship is positive (In a cointegration model like the ax+by+cz=0, signs are reversed to find relationship). 
The relationship between direct taxation and nominal interest rate is also significant but the coefficient on TAX 
appears very large. It implies that an increase in government revenue of 1 percent of GNP is associated with a 
42.61 percentage point increase in the nominal interest rate.  
These results supports the optimal seigniorage theory suggesting that in the long run tax rates, inflation rates and 
nominal interest rates move together. Our findings are also in line with study of Mankiw (1987) on American 
Economy. However, these estimation results are not consistent with the empirical study of Aslan (2003) testing 
optimal seignoraige theory for Turkish economy. The linear trend variable is significant and negatively related to 
the inflation as it is predicted from unit root tests and figure 1 to 3.  
To check short run causality we use Wald test. If the coefficient of D(INF(-1)), D(INF(-2)), D(TAX(-1)) and 
D(TAX(-2)) jointly influence the INT variable then we conclude that there is the short run causality from INF 
and TAX to INT. Table 9 presents Wald test result. According to Chi-square statistics, we cannot reject null 
hypothesis suggesting that all the coefficients are equal to zero. It means that all the lags of TAX and INF jointly 
cannot cause INT. There is no short run causality coming from INF and TAX to INT.  
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Table 8. VECM estimation results 
Cointegration eq: INT(-1) -2.51*INF(-1) – 42. 6*TAX(-) + 2.14*TREND+ 28.90= 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Error Correction: D(INT) D(TAX) D(INF) 
ECT(-1) -0.316337 -4.32E-05 -0.013748 
 (0.55628) (0.00011) (0.10235) 
 [-3.15521] [-0.39565] [ 1.06555] 
D(INF(-1)) -0.499130 4.03E-05 -0.199339 
 (0.46037) (9.0E-05) (0.08470) 
 [-1.08420] [ 0.44621] [-2.35345] 
D(INF(-2)) -0.282119 3.71E-06 -0.103646 
 (0.29943) (5.9E-05) (0.05509) 
 [-0.94219] [ 0.06312] [-1.88138] 
D(INT(-1)) 701.4302 0.137932 357.7651 
 (1206.70) (0.23691) (222.015) 
 [ 0.58128] [ 0.58221] [ 1.61145] 
D(INT(-2)) -355.1551 0.096274 169.3505 
 (1077.27) (0.21150) (198.201) 
 [-0.32968] [ 0.45520] [ 0.85444] 
D(TAX(-1)) -0.352392 -0.000449 0.041410 
 (1.26205) (0.00025) (0.23220) 
 [-0.27922] [-1.81092] [ 0.17834] 
D(TAX(-2)) 0.606579 5.32E-05 -0.097041 
 (1.23043) (0.00024) (0.22638) 
 [ 0.49298] [ 0.22041] [-0.42866] 
C -1.946451 0.001924 -3.000102 
 (14.1319) (0.00277) (2.60005) 
 [-0.13773] [ 0.69345] [-1.15386] 
D94 44.97880 275.8908 0.003295 
 (12.8101) (11.4141) (0.01479) 
 [ 3.51120] [ 24.1710] [ 0.22272] 
D01 9.797895 34.76976 -0.002383 
 (16.5680) (14.7625) (0.01913) 
 [ 0.59138] [ 2.35528] [-0.12452] 
D08 -4.972880 -3.792858 0.006494 
 (12.5502) (11.1826) (0.01449) 
 [-0.39624] [-0.33918] [ 0.44804] 
R-squared 0.313653 0.238697 0.372873 
Adj. R-squared 0.084871 -0.015071 0.163830 
Sum sq. resids 97246.88 0.003748 3291.845 
S.E. equation 68.05001 0.013360 12.52017 
F-statistic 1.370968 0.940612 1.783718 
Notes: Standard erroros and t- values are given in () and [] respectively.  
 
Table 9. Diagnostic test: wald test result 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 0.182501 (4, 21) 0.9449 
Chi-square 0.730003 4 0.9476 
 
Our model also has no heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems shown at Appendix.  
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we tested Mankiw’s (1987) optimalseignioragetheory for Turkish economyusing yearly time series 
dataset for the period 1980-2011. This theory suggests that in the long run higher tax rates are associated with 
higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates.We use cointegration and vector error correction methods 
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(VECM) to find long run and short run relationship between variables. 
Econometric results of the study supports the optimal seigniorage theory suggesting in the long run higher tax 
rates are associated with higher inflation rates and higher nominal interest rates in Turkey. There is only one long 
run causality from inflation and tax revenue to nominal interest rates. Moreover, 31% of any deviation from long 
run equilibrium is smoothed in one year or in three year deviations converges to equilibrium point. Model 
suggests that one percent increase in inflation and tax revenue per GNP is associated with 2.5 and 42.6 percent 
increase in the nominal interest rates respectively.  
Our findings are in line with study of Mankiw (1987) on American economy. However, these estimation results 
are not consistent with the empirical study of Aslan (2003) testing optimal seignoraige theory for Turkish 
economy. 
VEC model also suggest that there is no short run causality from inflation and tax revenue to nominal interest 
rates.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1. D INF 
 
Figure A2. D TAX 
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Figure A3. D INT 
 
Graphes of Variables in First Difference 
 
Notes: 1 Here inflation is used in the sense of moneystock, but givenoutput, this is equivalenttochoosingthe rate of inflation (Mankiw, 1987: 
330).  
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Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH   
F-statistic 0.169003    Prob. F(2,24) 0.8455 
Obs*R-squared 0.374975    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8290 
 
          Null hypothesis: There is no ARCH effect 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 0.793290    Prob. F(2,19) 0.4668 
Obs*R-squared 2.234990    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3271 
 
          Null hypothesis: There is no serial correlation
